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Feminist Pedagogy and 
Education in Values 
Mark T. Brown 
University of Wisconsin Center-Marathon County 
The teaching of value-laden courses in the social sciences and the 
humanities, particularly philosophy and history, poses special demands 
upon balance in course content and instructional technique. The western 
tradition in ethical thought converges upon a specific approach to moral 
problems, an approach that too often fails to connect with the concerns 
of women, ethnic minorities, and other groups outside the cultural 
mainstream. Moral problems are traditionally understood in terms of 
competing ethical theories involving abstract moral principles. This type 
of subject matter naturally lends itself to a deductive, lecture-oriented 
instructional format. The structure of one or more ethical theories is 
sketched, the key concepts defined, the basic principles analyzed, and the 
moral problem itself resolved as an application of the ethical theory in 
question. Many undergraduates implicitly reject this approach to value 
conflict by rejecting the conclusions of apparently cogent arguments 
derived from classical ethical theory. This phenomenon has prompted 
reflective educators to reconsider their accustomed analytical tools and 
the classroom atmosphere that use of those tools engenders. 
In this essay, I will consider briefly an alternative approach to teaching 
value-laden courses found in the feminist pedagogy inspired by the work 
of Carol Gilligan and developed by Nell Noddings, among others (Gil-
ligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984). To supplement the traditional hierarchy of 
moral principles, Gilligan and Noddings urge greater emphasis upon the 
web of interpersonal relations· and responsibilities embedded within the 
social context in which moral dilemmas and value conflict arise. They 
argue that the range of choice open to a moral agent depends crucially 
upon the special personal relationships and emotional attachments of the 
particular individuals involved. I will suggest that careful attention to these 
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insights can result in more effective instruction in the critical assessment 
of value conflicts and can point toward a model of undergraduate educa-
tion that better prepares students to cope with difficult choices in their 
own lives. Feminist pedagogy thus directs our attention toward both 
alternative methods in the teaching of values and the values implicit in the 
education students receive. 
Two Models of Moral Development 
Instruction regarding the moral, personal, and social policy implica-
tions of abortion illustrates the need for a fresh approach to learning about 
values. Arguments that take as premises the role in ethical theory of such 
personal characteristics as consciousness, rationality, and the experience 
of pleasure and pain, and draw conclusions concerning the moral status 
of the fetus often appear remote and aridly abstract to undergraduates. 
Similarly, considerations of historical precedent, cost-benefit calcula-
tions, and the dictates of theological doctrine can leave undergraduates 
unmoved, unconvinced, and uninterested. 
Some educators are tempted to treat this kind of unresponsiveness as 
evidence of incomprehension and moral immaturity. After al~ it is thought 
that the issue of abortion clearly falls under these ethical principles or 
within the scope of that legal precedent, or has such and such positive and 
negative social consequences. The fault thus lies with the student for 
failing to grasp the deductive subsumption of a value-laden issue, in this 
case abortion, within a more inclusive intellectual framework. 
This type of attitude from teachers often springs from a theory of 
moral development associated with (but not endorsed by) the Harvard 
psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1981). Moral development 
is seen as a progressive detachment of personal and subjective attitudes 
in favor of more neutral and objective categories of evaluation. Early 
concentration upon personal rewards and punishment gives way to con-
cern with social acceptance and respect for the conventional rules of the 
family, group, and nation. At the pinnacle of moral development, moral 
agents deduce rules of conduct from the fundamental principles of ethical 
theory. 
Carol Gilligan and others have subjected this model of moral 
development to vigorous criticism. Gilligan found that the thinking of 
many women who considered having an abortion would be classified as 
merely conventional, and that these same women, when interviewed some 
years later, actually had regressed on this scale of moral development. 
Gilligan suggested that women and perhaps cultural minorities respond 
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to issues of value conflict in a fashion that is different from, but not 
necessarily incompatible with, this model. She argued that the history of 
the personal relationships and the biographies of the people involved in 
a value conflict can be crucial to an incisive analysis of the moral problem 
that results, and that the women she interviewed implicitly recognized this. 
In many situations, concentrating upon the details of social context can be 
exactly the right approach, while premature attention to abstract moral 
principles can be an unhelpful distraction. This alternative way of thinking 
about moral problems is at once more accessible to large segments of the 
population and more productive of genuine understanding of the concrete 
reality of the clash of interests and claims of right. On this model of moral 
development, student unresponsiveness to traditional ways of treating 
value conflict reflects both the one-sided character of traditional ethical 
analysis and student dissatisfaction with the teaching methods that are its 
natural companion. 
Conventional, teacher-centered instructional methods are seen as 
guided by the judicial paradigm of blind justice. An ideal judge dispas-
sionately dispenses rewards and punishments while maintaining strict 
neutrality towards the persons involved. Traditionally in education, the 
perspective of an uninvolved third party is seen as the proper vantage 
point from which to describe social conflict. The web of interpersonal 
connection is intentionally deleted from the judicial model of conflict 
resolution; at the same time, instruction by deductive subsumption dis-
tracts attention from the details of social context that can bring to life the 
diversity of social interaction. 
Perhaps an attitude of studied impartiality is appropriate from a 
governing official, but for those to whom they matter most, moral dilem-
mas are lived from within a specific interpersonal context. From the 
perspective of the participants in a crisis situation, the bonds of family, 
friendship, personal responsibility, and loyalty are absolutely crucial and 
cannot be factored out of the equation without at the same time draining 
the resulting analysis of cogency. For Gilligan, sensitivity to the role of 
personal relationships should be seen as a means to achieve a realistic 
assessment of the available options. In the classroom, concentrating upon 
abstract legal, ethical, or religious principles can obscure the details of 
interpersonal connection that many students intuitively believe to be 
essential to a deep understanding of actual cases of value conflict. 
Gilligan contends that this more immediate and contextual approach 
to moral agency is to be found more frequently among girls and women 
than among boys and men. She cites empirical studies that support this 
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claim and traces this divergence in thought patterns to the dynamics of 
psychosexual development. She argues persuasively that girls tend to 
identify the developing self with their mothers and to see this connection 
to an Other as essential to their social identity. In contrast, sex role 
socialization for boys typically leads to a felt need to sever the psychologi-
cal tie between self-image and mother-image. Boys and men often come 
to see independence and self-reliance as signs of emotional maturity. 
Partly as a result, classical liberal justifications of an inviolable sphere of 
privacy and Kantian claims of the moral primacy of personal autonomy 
strike many men as virtually self-evident maxims of conduct. Interference 
in the affairs of another person is seen as wrong; non-interference is seen 
as recognition of the equal rights of others. 
Gilligan claims that the experience and psychology of many women 
resonates more deeply with an interpretation of moral agency that takes 
seriously the contextual background of social interaction. In this alterna-
tive interpretation of value conflict, selfiShness and self-absorption are 
seen as wrong; helping others and maintaining the bonds of personal 
connection are seen as right. Individuals are seen not as neutral bearers 
of rights and centers of independent agency, but rather as persons defined 
in large measure by their status within a network of special relationships 
and emotional attachments. Many women think that the proper approach 
to cases of value conflict resides not in the rational adjudication of 
competing interests, but rather in drawing upon and maintaining existing 
lines of interpersonal connection in order to restore and strengthen the 
bonds of community and to satisfy all parties to the extent possible. 
Gilligan does not claim that men invariably find the deductive ap-
proach most natural or that women in general adopt a more contextualist 
attitude. Clearly, many men and many women exemplify both patterns of 
thought, but the nearly exclusive emphasis in undergraduate education 
upon deductive hierarchy often distorts the social reality of value conflict 
and distorts it in a way more likely to be felt by women students than by 
men students. 
Implications for the Teaching of Values 
What can (and what should) be done to address this kind of imbalance 
in undergraduate education? In philosophy courses, contextualist inter-
pretations of value judgements can be taught alongside the survey of 
ethical theories, while the analysis of appropriate emotional response can 
be conducted in conjunction with the analysis of moral argument. The 
feminist critique of traditional models of moral development can be 
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integrated into the review of ethical theory, and alternative frameworks 
for the analysis of value conflict can be presented explicitly in the class-
room; but one must not fall into the trap of embedding these ideas in yet 
another lecture. Feminist pedagogy should inform both course content 
and classroom management. 
Social science and history courses, as well as courses specifically 
designed to confront moral problems, could benefit from supplementing 
primary source and textbook readings with case studies of value conflict. 
Case studies bring home to students the immediacy of moral problems 
and provide a useful format to display both abstract principles and the 
relevance of social context. The use of case studies can be combined 
effectively with cooperative learning techniques. Often students in groups 
of four or five feel free to express their thoughts openly, especially when 
the abstract concepts are pegged to a narrative describing named in-
dividuals involved in actual situations. 
Implications for Values in Teaching 
Recognition that the classroom itself is an arena of social interaction 
and personal relationships is equally important. Highly structured, 
teacher-oriented classroom management implicitly endorses a formal and 
hierarchical model of social interaction. An instructor who models the 
traditional deductive approach through well-organized lectures and read-
ings also can model the contextualist approach by promoting a classroom 
atmosphere in which nontraditional responses to questions of value 
choice are welcomed. 
Recent research has indicated that women students are more likely 
to be discouraged from active participation in their own education. Col-
lege professors, whether male or female, call upon the raised hands of 
male students more often than the raised hands of female students, 
interrupt their female students more frequently than their male students, 
and, in general, are more likely to reward their male students with verbal 
praise. Partly as a result, female students tend to be much more tentative 
in the classroom. Women students typically frame their contributions in 
the form of questions rather than assertions; and when declarative state-
ments are made, they often will be prefaced by qualifications of subjec-
tivity ("I feel that ... ") or followed by interrogative trailers (" ... don't you 
think?"). Testimony from college teachers indicates that their behavior is 
unintended and unconscious. Greater sensitivity to what Bernice Sandler 
calls the "chilly classroom climate" for women can lead to just the sort of 
222 To Improve the Academy 
social diversity and learning by doing that feminist pedagogy has long 
recommended. 
Explicit avowals in the classroom of the insights of contextualist 
accounts of value judgement should be reinforced by the teacher's implicit 
recognition of the importance of personal relationships in the process of 
education. Students should know that their understanding of the subject 
is more significant to the instructor than the quantity of material covered, 
the pace of instruction, or a pre-set sequence of assignments. To the extent 
that the subject matter permits, syllabi should be flexible in the sense that 
time is budgeted for "falling behind," expanding or contracting various 
aspects of the course, and rearranging the sequence of topics studied. 
More than anything else, grading discloses the distinctive and in-
herently unequal character of the teacher/student relationship. This asym-
metry should be neither avoided nor denied. The importance of the details 
of personal relationships in eduation as elsewhere is one of the key insights 
of the view Gilligan and Noddings urge. 
Teachers must view their subject matter through the eyes of their 
students if students are to grasp and retain the material (Noddings, 1984). 
The teacher's interpretation of course content needs to be presented in 
language the student can grasp and in a form that encompasses the 
student's motivation and (possibly ill-understood) goals. This ability to 
include within their own subjectivity the subjectivity of the student is the 
mark of effective teachers. 
Grading threatens effective teacher/student relationships in part be-
cause it encourages the student to attempt a similar inclusion of the 
teacher's subjectivity. Education can become an elaborate guessing game 
for students in which academic success results in large measure from skill 
in anticipating the teacher's instructional goals and preferred responses. 
As long as colleges function in our society as professional certification 
agencies, this type of student attitude is understandable and probably 
inevitable, but certain types of evaluation procedures exacerbate the 
problem. Exams and classroom management methods that depend upon 
uncertainty of content or timing not only generate student anxiety, but also 
tempt students to "psych out" their teacher. An evaluation instrument that 
lists a number of essay questions, topics, or skills to be selected by the 
instructor at the point of evaluation measures and promotes the tendency 
of students to try to overcome the natural asymmetry of the teacher/stu-
dent relationship. Unscheduled quizzes and unsolicited requests to 
answer questions create a tense classroom atmosphere and perpetuate 
the adversarial teacher/student relationship inherited from high school. 
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Where course content permits, exams should be open-book and the 
structure and timing of evaluation periods clearly forecast. If possible, 
students should be permitted to rework course requirements if dissatis-
fied with an initial grade. 
Conclusion 
Much of what Gilligan, Noddings, and others urge has been under-
stood and put into practice for years by good teachers. Nonetheless, a 
perspicuous statement and justification of feminist pedagogy can point 
toward unsuspected insights and wider use of methods that have proven 
to be successful. Both deductive, lecture-oriented instructional methods 
and the more informal interpersonal approach advocated by Noddings 
and others have their place in value-laden courses, because real moral 
problems have both cognitive/intellectual and social/emotional aspects. 
An understanding of the multi-dimensional character of value conflicts 
can make more immediately apparent the relevance of moral rules and 
other general principles to appropriate behavior in morally complex 
situations. Conversely, showing students how moral principles can guide 
behavior by embedding them within classroom management can help 
bring to life what once seemed a series of arid abstractions. 
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